There's a strange debate going on at the moment over the US Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual (pdf). One Ralph Peters objects to its (as he sees it) over-emphasis on politics, while Dave Dilegge responds by taking issue with various parts of Peters's analysis (hat-tip Mark Grimsley).

I'm certainly not qualified to comment on any of these debates in depth, although I do object to Peters's misconception that we academics only cite examples that support our arguments. We undergo a peer-review process specifically so that we can't do that. Anyway, I have a feeling that Peters also misunderstands the 20:80 military-political ratio cited in the report. He says that progress can't be made without squashing the more unruly of the natives (perhaps that's just a little bit of a misrepresentation). So, he concludes the military aspect of counter-insurgency is far more important than the ratio gives it credit for.

Perhaps Peters ought to have a peek at the British Army's report (pdf, with thanks to Will Crawley for the link) on Operation Banner. As I recall, one very significant aspect of this report is the army's (revisionist perhaps) self-conception of holding the line and containing the violence until politics could actually kick in and resolve the problems. I suspect that that - not some totting up of various actions on a war-war/jaw-jaw balance sheet - is what the 20:80 conception refers to.